When individual workers negotiate employment terms that differ from those of coworkers, these idiosyncratic arrangements or i-deals may benefit both the individual worker and employer, but coworkers may respond negatively unless certain conditions apply. We distinguish functional idiosyncratic arrangements from their dysfunctional counterparts, and develop propositions specifying how i-deals are formed and impact workers and coworkers. We also outline the implications of i-deals for employment relations research and contemporary employment practices.
When individual workers negotiate employment terms that differ from those of coworkers, these idiosyncratic arrangements or i-deals may benefit both the individual worker and employer, but coworkers may respond negatively unless certain conditions apply. We distinguish functional idiosyncratic arrangements from their dysfunctional counterparts, and develop propositions specifying how i-deals are formed and impact workers and coworkers. We also outline the implications of i-deals for employment relations research and contemporary employment practices. (Cappelli, 2000) and heightened expectations among workers for a say in their experiences at work (Freeman & Rogers, 1999) . Together, these forces promote greater customization in various aspects of employment . As such, i-deals are to some extent a feature of ever-shifting paradigms regarding the employment relationship.
This article addresses three fundamental issues: the context of i-deals, that is, when and how they occur, their content and its consequences for employers and workers, and the impact of i-deals on coworkers who are third parties to a colleague's negotiation of an i-deal. In doing so, it also highlights the implications idiosyncratic arrangements have for research on the employment relationship and their practical applications in response to contemporary changes faced by workers and firms.
DEFINING I-DEALS
Idiosyncratic deals, or i-deals, refer to voluntary, personalized agreements of a nonstandard nature that individual employees negotiate with their employer regarding terms which benefit each party. These individualized employment arrangements differ to some extent from those received by coworkers. Several distinct features characterize ideals and differentiate them from other forms of person-specific employment arrangements (e.g., cronyism or favoritism, as described below). Specifically, i-deals are:
• Individually negotiated: An i-deal arises when an individual worker negotiates arrangements with an employer or prospective employer that differ from his or her coworkers. The market power of certain workers and the value their employer places upon these workers positions them to demand compensation and perquisites significantly greater than their less favored coworkers (Bartol & Martin, 1989) . While either the employer or worker can initiate the i-deal, each can shape the actual terms negotiated. Our focus here is on i-deals workers initiate.
• Heterogeneity: At least some of the specific terms included in the arrangement are specially provided to that individual, differing from conditions other employees experience in similar positions or in the same work group. This results in within-group heterogeneity (Klein, Dansereau & Hall, 1994) in some aspects of the rewards and benefits certain workers receive relative to their coworkers.
• Employer and employer both benefit: I-deals serve the interests of both employers and employees. I-deals are distinct from other forms of personspecific employment arrangements in that the negotiation is based on the value of the individual worker to the employer (Rousseau, 2003) . The firm attracts, motivates, or retains the services of a valued contributor while the worker obtains resources of particular personal value.
• Variation in scope: I-deals individual workers enjoy can vary in scope from a single idiosyncratic element in a larger standardized employment package to a complete, entirely idiosyncratic employment arrangement. For example, one worker with an i-deal might have distinctly more flexible hours than peers but otherwise share with them the same pay, job duties, and other conditions of employment. In contrast, another worker might have a unique arrangement in which almost all employment terms are specially negotiated, from pay and hours, to duties and title. Thus, both these individuals have idiosyncratic features in their employment arrangements although the relative proportion of idiosyncratic to standardized conditions is greater for the second worker than the first.
A central feature of i-deals is that the employee has had a hand in creating or negotiating some aspect of his or her employment. The negotiations involved in creating such arrangements can constitute a form of participation or voice in which individual workers influence their employment conditions (Freeman & Rogers, 1999) .
I-deals often occur in the context of an employment relationship that provides some conditions that are standard to all workers (e.g., company-wide benefits) and others specific to those in particular positions (e.g., professionals as opposed to unskilled workers). Being able to negotiate idiosyncratic conditions is a sign of one's acceptance as a valuable commodity-someone worthy of special treatment, akin to the phenomenon of idiosyncrasy credits accorded to high status group members (Hollander, 1958) . I-deals originate from some of the same processes, where using the credits a worker has at his or her disposal can take the form of leveraging potential mobility or high contributions to obtain special visibility and recognition along with more concrete rewards such as money and perks. Implicit in the use of idiosyncrasy credits is existence of a differentiated perception of the individual and his or her contribution to the group (Hollander, 1958) . Ideals are based on differentiated perceptions of the individual on the part of the employer and his or her past, present, or future contribution to the organization.
I-deals occur in the context of a broader set of arrangements characterizing an individual's employment. They differ from both standardized employment terms workers receive by virtue of membership in the firm (e.g., health care benefits provided all regular employees) and the narrower set of terms associated with particular positions or jobs (e.g., the flexibly scheduled vacation time accorded a firm's professional staff but not its production workers; Figure 1 ). Although standardizing employment conditions (e.g., through wage structures, bonuses, or benefit plans) is a means of promoting cooperation and trust (Lazear, 1981) , employers also face increasing pressure to attract highly valued workers by offering desirable employment conditions. The result is that more idiosyncratic elements are included in some individuals' employment arrangements. It does, however, raise issues of the appropriateness of i-deals from the perspectives of coworkers. For example, one's coworkers are likely to raise questions about the fairness of their own treatment relative to the recipient of the i-deal (Greenberg, Roberge, Ho, & Rousseau, in press ).
With respect to the array of rewards and benefits individual workers receive, ideals represent a form of within-unit heterogeneity (Klein, Dansereau & Hall, 1994 ).
This heterogeneity can mean different things to the employer, the individual worker, and his or her coworkers. From the frame of reference of an employer who differentiates among a set of workers, this heterogeneity can indicate the impact of management practices rewarding high performers (thereby promoting instrumentality beliefs; Vroom, 1964) . To a worker with an i-deal, it can signal the value an employer places in him or her. To coworkers, within-unit heterogeneity in the nature of rewards and benefits can signal their own relative standing in the eyes of the employer, the flexibility and supportiveness with which the employer treats its workers generally, or both.
Importantly, an i-deal conveys potentially divergent messages to workers depending upon whether they are its principals or third parties. A consultant who has negotiated to be assigned to projects that develop particularly valuable skills may believe her employer is very supportive. Her coworkers, unaware of why special projects have been allocated to only one of them, can see the employer favoring one while being neglectful and uncaring to the rest. Idiosyncratic arrangements nonetheless have the potential for being seen as fair by third parties, if these be appropriately differentiated from other person-specific arrangements that are patently unjust and self-serving (Rousseau, 2003) What I-Deals Are Not: Dysfunctional Person-Specific Arrangements I-deals negotiated by workers differ from other person-specific employment practices (see Table 1 ). One widely recognized form of preferential arrangement is favoritism or cronyism, in which a firm's agents (e.g., supervisors) favor certain workers over others based on relational factors (e.g., personal relations or political ties). Such arrangements are self-serving from the individual agent's perspective, and not necessarily beneficial to his or her firm (Pearce, Branyiczki & Bigley, 1994; Rousseau, 2003) . In fact, such arrangements can undermine the legitimacy of the formal organization by allowing rule bending and workarounds to dominate formal rules and agreed-upon procedures. It is doubtful that "playing favorites" benefits an organization overall even if it were to result in having a lackey willing to do a manager's bidding. Moreover, these arrangements are predicated upon connections and not on individual capabilities that add value to a company (Clarke, 1999) . In contrast, through an i-deal a worker gains some preferred employment condition(s) and the employer attracts, motivates or retains a contributor to the organization. Thus both parties benefit. Table 1 about here
Another form of person-specific employment condition is unauthorized arrangements, such as when workers take resources from their employers for personal use without permission (Greenberg, 1998; Rousseau, 2003) . Unauthorized arrangements are unilateral confiscation of employer resources by the worker and can harm the employer. Although most acts of employee theft occur without management's knowledge, some managers have been known to turn a blind eye to acts of employee theft, publicly denying them, but privately acknowledging their occurrence (Greenberg & Tomlinson, in press) . That is, an unspoken norm sometimes develops that theft is tolerated, at least if kept within certain parameters (Dalton, 1959; Ditton, 1997a Ditton, , 1997b .
Even more extreme cases have been reported in which managers have actively encouraged acts of theft, using the pilfered merchandise as a means for rewarding employees who agree to perform certain undesirable jobs (e.g., working the late-night shift in convenience stores; Greenberg & Scott, 1996) . Nonetheless, both favoritism and unauthorized arrangements serve the interests of individuals but not the firm, undermining the legitimacy of its formal practices and eroding the trust workers place in it (Pearce, 2001; Rousseau, 2003) .
Implications
I-deals extend our understanding of person-specific arrangements beyond politicking and self-interest to circumstances where both workers and firms benefit from flexibility. Workers whose employers derive competitive advantage from their contributions, such as those in knowledge-intensive firms (Cappelli, 2000; Leana & Rousseau, 2000) , are a fertile source of i-deals. So too are start-up firms where flexible work roles often offset the employer's inability to pay its workers at market rates (Levesque, 2001) . The distinctiveness of i-deals lies in the conditions giving rise to them, the motivations behind them, and their potential for acceptance as fair by third parties.
Yet i-deals have received little systematic attention from scholars.
CONTEXTS OF I-DEALS
We next address the contexts in which i-deals arise and their impact on employee responses. Circumstances both firms and workers face can impact the nature of the bargaining process between them. Due to the decline of unionism and weakening labor laws in many developed nations, fewer conditions of employment are pre-set at the state or firm level, creating greater potential for variations in i-deals (Cappelli, 2000; Rousseau & Schalk, 2000) . Likewise, the market power of some workers puts them in position to demand compensation and perquisites significantly greater than other less marketable coworkers (Bartol & Martin, 1989 ). An i-deal also may reflect the strategic needs of firms targeting particular segments of the labor market for which the firm's existing practices are not particularly attractive (e.g., young professionals, senior citizens, or parents of small children; Ingram & Simon, 1994; Lee, MacDermid, & Buck, 2000) .
Highly Valued Workers
Negotiating an i-deal is a form of customization, making it possible for employees to work under conditions consistent with their personal needs, values, and preferences.
Individuals can value the same resources differently. Opportunities to travel may be exciting to an unattached 20-something worker and a burden to middle aged one with a large family. Idiosyncratic arrangements allow individuals to find at work resources and opportunities they particularly value. Although such individual differences always have existed, traditional employment relationships in the developed world downplayed them, where forces for consistency and standardization have been a means for creating cooperation and trust at work (Pearce, 2001) . The liberalization of labor laws and the reduced popularity of unionism, coupled with growing recognition of the value of human capital to a firm's competitive advantage (Leana & Rousseau, 2000; Pfeffer, 1998) , have opened the doors to negotiating i-deals instead of accepting standardized offers. Against the backdrop of fewer pre-set conditions governing terms of employment, workers who recognize the value that potential or current employers place upon them can assert their preferences overtly in the form of bargaining or more subtly hinting of alternative opportunities elsewhere (Rousseau, in press ). Greater ease of mobility among talented people, especially those firms recognize as critical to their competitive advantage, only adds to their bargaining power in creating i-deals (Frank & Cook, 1995) .
Proposition 1: Individuals who are more highly valued by an employer (e.g., high performers or critical and highly marketable workers) are more likely to be granted idiosyncratic employment terms than those who are valued less.
Workers From Non-Traditional Backgrounds
The pressure to reach i-deals is likely to be particularly great whenever a firm competing for labor seeks workers from backgrounds differing from its traditional employee base (Ingram & Simon, 1994) . Law and accounting firms, for example, have had difficulties recruiting and retaining women because of their widespread use of timebased, up-or-out promotion hierarchies, whose high-pressure, competitive internal markets have been characterized as "rat races" (Landers, Rebitzer & Taylor, 1996) . Such environments are unattractive for young women seeking to combine professional career development with child rearing, and thus managers are often more inclined to create ideals for women than for their male counterparts (e.g., parental leaves that do not prejudice the worker's future career options; Klein, Berman, & Dickson, 2000) .
Particularly in firms valuing diversity, i-deals can be an offset to the constraints of existing practices and particularly likely among valued workers whose needs are at odds with a firm's standard human resource management practices, such as a partner in a traditional law firm who is a nursing mother.
Proposition 2: Firms are more likely to offer i-deals to valued workers from backgrounds distinct from those they traditionally recruit than those from less unique backgrounds.
Repeated use of similar arrangements to recruit individuals from non-traditional backgrounds ultimately may result in a revision of standard employment terms, making them standard rather than idiosyncratic. In other words, once-unique policies are likely to become institutionalized if the factors that give rise to idiosyncratic arrangements continue, as in the case of flex-time originally introduced in response to the needs of women workers becoming a standard management practice (Ingram & Simon, 1994) .
Proposition 3: A firm that meets its human resource needs by offering a particular type of i-deal to workers from non-traditional backgrounds will make the arrangement more available to workers generally if that practice continues over time.
I-deals that are successful from the firm's perspective become a source of new work structures and human resource practices promoting both adaptation to changing environments and legitimatization of the firm's employment practices.
The Timing of I-Deals
Workers typically negotiate i-deals with their employers in two contexts: during the recruiting process (i.e., ex ante; before employment), and on-the-job once a relationship has been established (i.e., ex post; after employment). (Other idiosyncratic negotiations, such as those occurring at the end of employment via termination or retirement, are not treated here and may be governed by different processes.)
To a great extent, labor markets dictate the dynamics and normative appropriateness of negotiating ex ante i-deals. For example, workers in a "hot" labor market, where certain skills are in high demand but short supply, might be expected to seek out and obtain more i-deals based on their personal desires and preferences (Cappelli, 2000) than do those whose skills are demanded less. Under such conditions, information about others' successes in negotiating i-deals is likely to be communicated informally and very rapidly (Belliveau, 2000; Granovetter, 1995) , thereby promoting interest in such arrangements. As qualified applicants clamor to "get in" on the good deals, a "gold rush effect" can occur. This accounts for why i-deals were so common among employees of dot-com firms in the late 1990s (e.g., Buckman, 2000) . Under such circumstances workers are not likely to attribute the firm's willingness to provide them special accommodations as an indication of the firm's quality as an employer or its positive intentions toward the individual worker. Rather, workers bargaining ex ante are likely to attribute receipt of an i-deal to their personal market value. Whereas market-based attributions predominate among workers with ex ante i-deals, we expect that workers will attribute their ex post i-deals to the quality of their relationship with the employer.
Proposition 4: Ex post i-deals are more positively related to workers' beliefs regarding the quality of their employment relationship than are ex ante i-deals.
The role ex post i-deals play as a signal of relationship quality is at once a consequence as well as a reason workers propose them in the first place and why employers grant them, a point we develop below in the section on Content.
Since collaboration and trust are reduced with wide disparities in monetary and other more visible conditions of employment, we expect that employers in general will be reluctant to grant ex ante i-deals to all but those workers who are deemed to be most critical or in demand. Ex ante i-deals may be limited severely in settings where labor practices are highly regulated (e.g., government employment) or where societal or cultural norms make them taboo (e.g., in China and Singapore, ex ante negotiation is considered too assertive; Rousseau & Schalk, 2000) . In contrast, once a relationship exists between workers and managers within a firm, even settings that discourage ex ante bargaining may promote informal negotiations and accommodations between individual workers and their employers. It is far more likely that idiosyncratic arrangements enter into the employment relationship after workers have formed a relationship with their employers, that is to say, we expect ex post i-deals to be more common than are ex ante ideals.
Proposition 5: Other things being equal, an individual worker is more likely to negotiate an ex post i-deal than an ex ante one.
Repeated Bargaining
Thus far, our discussion of i-deals has focused on discrete arrangements made on single occasions. However, in relationships between employees and employers, the meaning of i-deals potentially can change over time. Although initial i-deals are likely to be offered and interpreted as special, subsequent i-deals may be interpreted differently by all parties. Diminishing marginal returns can result for both principals as each subsequent deal is less special. Moreover, individuals who propose i-deals may grow concerned about the impressions of themselves they are creating by pursuing such arrangements.
Individuals who repeatedly seek i-deals are likely to be seen as "players"-those who are motivated primarily by the thrill of gaming the system. Organizations, on their end, may also be unwilling to make i-deals with the same people repeatedly, for fear of being construed as practicing favoritism or acting capriciously, and creating dissatisfaction among other employees. This potential sensitivity suggests a trend toward selective and limited use of i-deals.
Proposition 6: Concerns about the impressions created by proposing repeated ex post i-deals will moderate workers' willingness to propose them over time.
Proposition 7: Concerns about the impressions created by offering repeated ex ante i-deals will moderate employers' willingness to offer them over time.
THE CONTENT OF I-DEALS
The specific terms or content of idiosyncratic employment arrangements provide insight into the exchange relations between workers and employers, the reward strategies employers use to attract, retain and motivate workers, and how workers understand these strategies and seek to get their own needs met. I-deals have been found to contain any number of diverse resources that workers value-from pay and travel expenses to mentoring, development, and personal support (Rousseau, Ho & Kim, 2003; . Foa and Foa (1975) proposed an extensive, widely studied resource classification based upon six categories: money, goods, services, information, status, and love (the latter termed affiliation/friendship by Parks, Conlon, Ang & Bontempo, 1999) .
These categories are classified along two dimensions: whether the resources are concrete (tangible) or abstract (conveyed through verbal and paralinguistic behaviors), and whether they are particular (their meaning and value depending upon their source and context) or universal (having common meaning and value across sources and contexts).
Exchanging particularistic resources typically requires a relationship between giver and receiver. Particularistic resources include bestowing special status (e.g. recognition), services that benefit another's well being (e.g. development, mentoring) and love expressed via concern and socioemotional support (e.g., support and flexibility in response to a family crisis). Though goods or money can be exchanged between parties who do not know each other, relationships typically are the basis for particularistic 
Expanding Resources Offered in Employment
Firms seeking to recruit valued workers can find it difficult to compete if wages are the only dimension on which they bargain with and motivate employees. Broadening the employment package, what Bloom and Milkovich (1996) have termed the compensation bundle, to include non-monetary and particularistic as well as concrete, monetary resources, enhances an employer's ability to recruit, motivate and retain talent while helping the firm remain competitive. Particularistic resources constitute part of an invisible wage structure, providing informal ways organizations can compensate workers.
This invisible wage structure can range from higher quality relations with supervisors and greater job scope (Graen & Scandura, 1987) to employers who overlook the odd or deviant behavior on the part of otherwise high performers (Frank, 1985; Greenberg & Scott, 1996; Hollander, 1972) . Particularistic resources lack fixed metrics, and thus their exchange is difficult to standardize or govern by rules. As such, employers and their agents (e.g., managers) can find it easier to offer particularistic idiosyncratic arrangements than concrete ones, especially those involving monetary resources.
Proposition 8: I-deals regarding particularistic employment terms are more likely to occur than concrete resource-based i-deals.
I-deals of a particularistic nature can account for a common finding in compensation research--that firms tend to under-pay high performers relative to their marginal productivity and to over-pay low performers (Frank, 1985; Gerhart & Milkovich, 1993) . If high performers are compensated in part via particularistic i-deals not accessed by lower performers, the employer is able to reward contributions in a way that is less likely to generate ill-feelings on the part of their lower performing coworkers.
Signaling the quality of the employment relationship
I-deals provide a means by which a worker can seek and his or her employer can demonstrate evidence of the quality of the relationship between them, thereby affirming the firm's commitment to the employee. The capacity to create an i-deal with one's employer can be construed as a reflection of a worker's value and importance. Employees typically desire more information than they receive regarding their standing in the organization (Ashford & Cummings, 1983) . Seeking an i-deal can provide a means of establishing one's position and value-sometimes taking the form of testing the waters when direct indicators of worth are difficult to obtain (Baxter & Wilmot, 1984; Rousseau, 1995) . Indeed, others may refrain from engaging in this exercise for fear of discovering undesirable facts about their standing in the organization, which they would rather not know.
The signaling function of i-deals can combine with access to particularistic resources to reduce the likelihood that the employee will seek employment with another firm. From the employer's vantage point, i-deals provide an opportunity to make a worker's job particularly valuable by creating an employment relationship that might be difficult to obtain elsewhere (Lazear, 1981) . Although applicants readily may bargain over pay and hours, it is far more difficult for them to bargain for more intangible features, such as respect or interpersonal support. Offering intangible benefits signals employer concern about the individual worker's well-being, enhancing not only a worker's organizational commitment (Meyer & Allen, 1997 ), but also his or her sense of reciprocity and obligation (Eisenberger, Armeli, Rexwinkel, Lynch, & Rhodes, 2001 ).
Particularistic resources are a subset of non-monetary resources, requiring a special relationship between parties for the resources to be exchanged. Such resources as receiving mentoring and recognition take on their distinctive value in the relationship formed between the giver and recipient. Thus, we expect that i-deals regarding particularistic resources will send stronger signals about the quality of the employment relationship than will those based upon universalistic resources such as pay and benefits.
Proposition 9: I-deals regarding particularistic resources will be more highly and positively related to workers beliefs regarding the quality of the relationship with the employer than i-deals regarding universal resources.
The Interaction of Content and Timing
The timing of the idiosyncratic negotiation affects the perspective from which each party views the relationship. Different relational schemas may be primed depending on the timing: market transaction ex ante and a mutual relationship ex post (e.g., Baldwin, 1992) . This is particularly the case where the i-deal comprises the types of resources commonly bargained for on the current job market (e.g., pay, promotion opportunities, or stock options). Moreover, the types of resources that would signal a high quality employment relationship, such as development and mentoring, might be more difficult to bargain for prior to joining an employer than once one is onboard. There are two reasons for this. First, the employee does not have the type of contextual knowledge regarding the firm that eases negotiating over particularistic conditions. Second, ex ante bargaining is more likely to be shaped by information accessible in the external market. Thus, whereas salary and benefits can be readily shared among job seekers and employers, more particularistic resources are difficult to identify, let alone to compare. Proposition 10: Ex ante i-deals are more likely to be based on concrete and universal resources than on particularistic and abstract resources.
Individual workers negotiate ex post in the context of an existing relationship with their employer. In contrast to pre-employment negotiations, a worker and employer who negotiate post-hire may share a good deal of knowledge about one another's interests and already exchange a broad array of resources. Ex post i-deals can occur more readily because of the more credible signals employers possess regarding a worker's value than exist pre-employment (Lazear, 1981) and the greater comfort level workers enjoy in making special requests of an employer with whom they now have a relationship (Rousseau, 2003) . The greater access to information and the resources available in an ongoing relationship make it likely that ex post i-deals will be more heterogeneous in nature and more customized to the personal interests of the worker. Employers in longstanding relationships tend to acknowledge loyalty, rewarding contributions based on an extended track record and by providing certain perks associated with seniority (Lazear, 1981; Ritter & Taylor, 2000) . Moreover, third parties are more likely to view special treatment as acceptable where individuals with otherwise equal market value and competence have seniority or an extended track record with the firm (Rousseau & Anton, 1988) . This is particularly likely to be the case when particularistic resources are offered to recognize contributions of high performing workers without creating more overt differences in the outcomes coworkers receive.
Proposition 11: Ex post i-deals are more likely to be based on particularistic and abstract resources than on concrete and universal ones.
Previously, we postulated a stronger relationship of i-deals involving particularistic resources to beliefs in a high quality employment relationship than found for monetary i-deals. Part of the underlying dynamic of this relationship, we believe, is that monetary arrangements are more likely to be made prior to employment, at a time when successful negotiation of one's preferences is likely to be attributed to market value rather than to quality of the employer. Basing i-deals on market factors is more likely not only at the time of hire, but also post-hire when workers bargain for salary increases.
Salary increases are more likely to be justified by market-related reasons than are accommodations made to workers that support their personal growth or development.
Whereas market-based attributions predominate among workers with ex ante i-deals and among workers with monetary-based i-deals regardless of timing, we expect that workers will attribute their ex post non-monetary or particularistic i-deals to the quality of their employment relationship. Interpretations are likely to depend on the content of the i-deal, which itself reflects worker and employer motives in creating the i-deal in the first place. Receipt of special accommodations regarding preferred assignments and development activities is positively related to recipient beliefs in a mutual commitment between themselves and their employer regarding internal mobility and relational support (Rousseau, Ho, & Kim, 2003) . Exchanging such resources necessitate an investment of time and effort on the part of both parties, with a greater likelihood of activating schemas regarding the employment exchange that impact each party's beliefs regarding their relationship and each other. In contrast, accommodations regarding pay and equipment have been found to have little impact on beliefs regarding the employment relationship (Rousseau, Ho, & Kim, 2003) .
Such resources can be provided with minimal interaction or on-going relationship between the parties. The extent to which workers feel obligated to provide reciprocity can vary with the i-deal's content and the context in which it arises.
COWORKER RESPONSES TO I-DEALS: IS IT FAIR?
Thus far, our analysis has focused on arrangements between an employee and his or her employers. However, this ignores a key stakeholder, coworkers. Because one's coworkers are likely to observe and form judgments about i-deals, it is important to consider their assessment of and reaction to the i-deals about which they learn.
Comparisons between oneself and one's coworkers are likely to be made especially salient by i-deals. I-deals negotiated by any particular individual differ, by definition, from those of his or her coworkers. (Note that where coworkers seek to match the employment terms already received by a fellow worker with an idiosyncratic arrangement, subsequent arrangements may no longer be idiosyncratic. Subsequent matching arrangements are motivated by different factors (e.g., perceived equity) than motivated the initial i-deal.)
Insofar as workers and their employers agree upon i-deals, these parties are inclined to perceive them as fair. However, their nonstandard nature can lead involved others, such as coworkers, to question their fairness (Greenberg et al., in press ). In other words, the fact that people are receiving differential treatment makes salient to observers the potential for unfairness. Workers may ask, for example, if their colleague's i-deal is fairly deserved (as opposed to favoritism) and what message is being sent about the fairness of the organization that engages in such arrangements (Greenberg, 1996) .
In other words, third parties-coworkers, in particular-are likely to have reactions to i-deals that differ from those of the principals. As in the case of any observers, as opposed to actors, they are likely to have different perspectives because they are not always privy to the same information (Jones & Nisbett, 1972) . When only the employer and the employee are likely to know the exact terms, others will learn about these incompletely and inaccurately through rumor and innuendo. Moreover, they are likely to be biased against perceiving these arrangements as fair if they were made in secret, behind closed doors, raising suspicions that there is something to hide. Also, because they are likely to be unfamiliar with the exact nature of the agreement, coworkers are not in a good position to judge its ultimate fairness. Thus, one's coworkers and other third parties may be expected to look upon i-deals as a growth medium for injustice, making them a potentially potent source of discord.
Nonetheless, coworkers need not necessarily judge i-deals to be unfair. We will outline some of the key considerations involved in assessing the fairness of i-deals. These are important insofar as repeated complaints about the unfairness of i-deals ultimately may lead to their prohibition, thereby denying employers and employees a key benefit and source of flexibility. In judging the fairness of i-deals, people are likely to consider how those arrangements were made-the issue to which we now direct attention.
Opportunity for Choice: Do Others Have the Same Options?
I-deals are likely to be perceived as fair by third parties to the extent that they believe they have opportunities to make similar arrangements themselves. Such is in effect the case in cafeteria-style pay plans (Barringer & Milkovich, 1997) , which may be considered a standardized vehicle for creating customized employment terms. In such programs, employees are permitted to select among a variety of benefit arrangements, permitting them to make choices based on their individual needs. And, because these benefits are limited by certain fixed cost parameters that are identical for all members of a work group, cafeteria pay plans promote a sense of fairness. The procedure may be considered distributively just insofar as it treats equals as equals; the organization cuts deals that are no more attractive for one person than another. Cafeteria-style pay plans also may be considered procedurally just in that they apply decision criteria consistently to all employees, who are given a voice in determining their outcomes (Tremblay, Sire, & Pelchat, 1998) . Finally, such arrangements may be considered interactionally just insofar as they communicate the organization's carte blanche commitment to satisfying employees' needs in a dignified manner.
Strictly speaking, however, the standardized nature of cafeteria-style pay plans does not allow them to be considered i-deals, which by their nature are exceptional. The fairness of actual i-deals may be difficult to establish in the eyes of interested third parties. For example, if John learns that his colleague, Mary, negotiated an i-deal that provides greater flexibility in work assignments, he may feel unfairly treated to the extent that he values such flexibility and believes he deserves it. However, such feelings may be reduced somewhat if John were to believe that he could receive identical treatment by asking for it, as would be the case where he perceived his relationships with both the supervisor and the employer generally as positive and supportive.
Proposition 13: A coworker's perceived fairness of a worker's i-deal will be positively related to the degree to which he or she believes it is possible to receive equally desirable outcomes.
Such conditions would hold where a worker receives a unique accommodation as part of a firm's policy of flexible support where even workers who access no special benefits can feel fairly treated knowing that if they needed such support it would be forthcoming.
Legitimate conditions for ex ante i-deals can differ from those for ex post ones.
Market factors tend to be legitimate considerations in ex ante negotiations, and third parties may accept differences in employment conditions generated by labor market factors at the time a higher paid colleague was hired (as in the case of salary compression, Brown & Woodbury, 1998) . However, reliance on market factors to negotiate an ex post i-deal is more likely to generate adverse reactions on the part of coworkers who see themselves as making comparable contributions to the firm.
Employers, though, are inclined to treat mobile workers more generously than their equally competent but non-mobile peers (a phenomenon termed "selective rational exploitation," by Rusbelt and her associates; Rusbelt, Lowery, Hubbarb, & Maravankin, 1988; Rusbelt, Campbell, & Price, 1990 )-a practice that can generate outrage and pursuit of outside offers on the part of peers. We expect that coworkers will react more positively to use of market factors as motivating an i-deal their employer grants to a new hire, than they will if used to justify granting special accommodations to a current employee.
Proposition 14:
Coworkers are likely to believe that market factors are a more legitimate basis for creating ex ante i-deals than for creating ex post i-deals.
Does Anyone Gain or Lose?
One person's special treatment can create costs for others, particularly when the parties are interdependent. In zero-sum situations, where resources are constrained, coworkers are more likely to experience a loss whenever a peer receives an i-deal. Time off for one person, for example, may result in more work for others. A worker who gets a raise because she received an outside offer reduces the pool of money available to give raises to her peers. Negative consequences from i-deals in resource-constrained situations are amplified by the tendency for human beings to be more sensitive to losses than they are to gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) . Costs coworkers incur when a colleague receives special treatment can be particularly salient.
Proposition 15: Third parties will perceive an i-deal as less fair when it results in costs to themselves than if it is cost-neutral.
A person receiving an i-deal can engender a more positive response from colleagues by taking steps to minimize their adverse impact. Such an individual also may need to manage relations with colleagues so as to enhance their perceptions of fairness. This is likely to involve offering an acceptable explanation to her peers as to why this arrangement was merited. They also may take ostensible steps to help coworkers who have been harmed by some way because of extra work or other demands their i-deals create (e.g., by doing favors or providing them additional help when needed).
Costs are not necessarily fixed, but depend on whether they can be managed or offset. There is a caveat, however. Sometimes, coworkers actually can benefit when a peer receives an i-deal, such as when special treatment for one person may lead to similar benefits to for others. Consider a university administrator's account of circumstances in which a faculty star was being wooed away by a more prestigious university: His colleagues came and demanded that we take action…whatever it takes to keep him, no teaching, twice the money…space, whatever. It's the bragging rights they're after, to be able to say that they work with [that individual]. (Rousseau, in press ).
In local hierarchies, status may be a thing of considerable value (the proverbial "big fish in a small pond, " Frank, 1985) . Moreover, while being at the bottom of a hierarchy has negative consequences, lower status members of a prestigious social unit can benefit from its standing and whatever other resources come with it (e.g. munificent resources). Where members realize gains from being in a high status group ("bragging rights"), being at the bottom is less of an issue.
Proposition 16: I-deals creating benefits for third parties are more likely to be accepted as fair than those that offer no such benefits.
Proposition 17: I-deals based upon particularistic and abstract resources are more likely to be viewed as fair by third parties than those based on concrete or universal resources.
The meaning and benefits third parties associate with I-deals are the essence of the distinctiveness of these otherwise unequal and procedurally inconsistent practices.
RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS
Through the lens of idiosyncratic arrangements, certain phenomena studied in organizational behavior can take on new meanings. Those highlighted here signal the potential research on i-deals to inform scholarship on the employment relationship generally.
Psychological Contracts in Employment
Psychological contracts, beliefs individual have regarding this exchange relationship (Rousseau, 1995) , can take different forms due to the nature of the resources workers exchange with employers, when those resources were offered (at hire or once on the job). I-deals regarding development and training opportunities are positively related to beliefs in both worker obligations to pursue career development with the employer as well as the employer's obligation to provide continuing opportunities. In contrast, those I-deals associated with pay and resources have limited impact on psychological contract beliefs (Rousseau, Ho, & Kim, 2003) . We expect that i-deals pertaining to particularistic resources will create a more relational psychological contract. In contrast, those dealing with universal resources will engender a more transactional one between a worker and his or her employer particularly if not supplemented with some particularistic resources.
However, where the compensation bundle combines a broad array of resources from each category it is more likely that workers will interpret even their employment's economic features from a relational perspective, where particularistic resources involved came about through idiosyncratic negotiation. I-deals and broad array of resources they can entail provide an opportunity to understand the exchange process whereby psychological contracts emerge. Moreover, ideals may constitute one way in which workers and employers flesh out what otherwise are inherently incomplete contracts (Williamson, 1975) .
A Fresh Look at (Some) Promotions
Certain promotions are likely to be a product of idiosyncratic arrangements.
Indeed, many events labeled a promotion involve no change in position or duties (Permagit & Veum, 1999) . Rather they are simply an upgrade of the current position. In a national sample of American workers, Permagit and Veum found that 56% received a promotion at their current job, which can mean continuing to perform the same duties as before but receiving a new title with more pay, or having one's existing position upgraded. A smaller portion of the sample involved the conventional understanding of a promotion: filling a higher level position or taking over one's supervisor's job. Thus many promotions do not entail the classic notion of a competitive tournament as Rosenberg (1979) described. According to Permagit and Veum, there is no competition in one-third of all promotions. In light of the dynamics of idiosyncratic contracting, some of these non-competitive promotions are likely to effectively formalize idiosyncratic accommodations made with regard to the skills, preferences, and aspirations of job incumbents, similar to the dynamics underlying idiosyncratic job creation (Miner, 1987) .
Compared with other types of promotion, position upgrades were more systematically related to wage increases for both women and men. It is likely that the idiosyncratic aspect of some promotions reflects ways in which individuals seek to expand their returns (e.g., status, wages, or recognition) from doing much the same work.
Dyadic and Group Processes Associated with Leader-Member Exchange
Ex post i-deals are closely tied to the relationship workers have with their immediate supervisor or manager-the representative of the firm with whom employees interact most frequently following hire (Rousseau, 2001) . This is particularly the case where the resources involved are developmental . Idiosyncratic arrangements may also shed light on the dynamics of leader-member exchange (LMX).
LMX theory predicts that within-group variation in a manager's treatment of individual workers is due to differences in trust and relationship quality that develop between a leader and members over time (Graen & Scandura, 1987) . Managers who maintain high quality interactions with certain subordinates over time are expected to provide them with provide creative flexibility to achieve both organizational and individual goals. The idiosyncratic arrangements that an individual subordinate negotiates can account for some of the consequences associated with LMX, such as higher commitment and trust. A positive relationship between employee and supervisor is likely to make it easier to propose an i-deal in the first place. Indeed, i-deals are unlikely to be proposed where the relationship is poor, unless that the employee is able to negotiate with another agent of the employer, such as a more senior manager or the human resource department.
Heterogeneity in Employment Conditions as a Characteristic of Work Groups
The theory of i-deals developed here suggests that within-group heterogeneity in work experiences and reward allocations is neither merely noise associated with differences in individual perceptions nor the effect of a worker's pet relationship with a boss. Systematic processes are at work whereby heterogeneity arises through ways in which workers and employers craft their relationship to motivate both high contributions to the firm and meet the needs of individuals. Yet, scholars have largely overlooked heterogeneity among coworkers in the terms of their employment. For example, LMX research has failed to investigate the impact of high LMX relations between a manager and one subordinate upon that person's peers. Moreover, justice research with its focus on distributive, procedural and interactional fairness (see Greenberg, 1996 , for a review) largely focuses on forces of consistency, equity, and equality while downplaying heterogeneity in the value and meanings individuals within a group associate with the different resources they receive. Our theoretical framework suggests that scholars have much to learn from investigating circumstances where within-group heterogeneity in resource exchanges and employment conditions are seen by participants as legitimate and where employers and firms experience positive outcomes.
Some resources by their very nature may need to be allocated differentially across members of a work group-resources Messick (1993) labeled "lumpy." Status, for instance is difficult to divide and even more difficult to give to all. Allocation rules have been found to vary by resource type (Parks et al., 1999) . In particular, status and love/affiliation/friendship resources have been found to generate wide disagreement on how to allocate them (Parks et al., 1999) . The impact of the nature of resources exchange in employment has received relatively little attention, not only from the perspective of allocation fairness but also in terms of meanings workers and employers attribute to them.
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
From a managerial perspective, little systematic attention has been given to conditions under which differentiating between co-workers can be functional and beneficial. I-deals offer employers a means of responding to competitive labor markets and diverse worker needs and preferences. Their potential benefits are more likely to be obtained where careful attention is paid to coworker concerns regarding justice. The dysfunctional consequences of pay secrecy and other covert employment practices underscore the need improved managerial learning and human resource practices that make i-deals acceptable to coworkers while meeting needs of the individual worker and his or her employer (Rousseau, 2001) . A wise personnel manager once said, "make no compensation decisions you wouldn't post on the employee bulletin board." When i-deals are made, they are most effective in creating a sense of fairness where their existence is openly communicated. It is likely that managers will be more willing to publicly acknowledge i-deals that are based on values widely shared in the organization (e.g., contribution, serious personal need, an opportunity for innovation or diversity; Klein et al., 2000) . The factors shaping coworkers reactions to i-deals, described above, offer a framework for helping employers identify features of i-deals that give them flexibility in accommodating individual workers while maintaining a sense of fairness on the part of their peers.
I-deals provide a basis for employers to identify potentially useful innovations in HR practice. The demand for alternative ways of motivating workers to stay and to perform well encourages experimentation regarding innovative incentives and inducements (Pfeffer, 1998; Cappelli, 2000) . Both workers and employers can benefit from looking to idiosyncratic arrangements as experiments, which if successful, can provide broadly applicable ways of re-configuring the employment relationship.
CONCLUSION
Modern firms and those who work in them face a need to improvise in response to change and complexity (Weick, 1996) and theories of behavior in organizations need to recognize the potential for heterogeneity in employment relations among workers ostensibly in the same positions. Improvisation challenges conventional management practice and theory where consistently applied procedures and homogenization of treatment play central roles. Though they may be more salient in highly competitive labor markets, i-deals are widespread, forming the basis of many long standing yet often subtly 
